John Stuart Mill's Position on Justice
For over 2000 years, philosophers have tried to lay the foundation of morality, but have yet to come closer to an agreement of what the notions of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ are based on. Mill argues that unlike science where “particular truth precedes general theory”, ethics needs ‘general laws’ in order for morality to have legitimacy or significance.
Justice corresponds with the idea of perfect obligation: it involves the idea of a personal right. In cases of justice, the person who has been wronged has had his or her moral right impinged upon; it is thus his or her moral right to seek restitution.
He doesn’t always agree that the female trait is a deficit or disqualifier. For instance, he thinks that being more intuitive, more practical, more focused on particulars, and less rigid allows women to compensate for deficits in the way that men typically approach decision-making. Women are less likely to follow principle for its own sake and are more likely to test principles by their real world consequences. They are better able to multi-task and intellectually more open-minded (Collini, S., 1979). Being morally superior and less aggressive are unqualified goods. However, he seems to concede that women are more excitable, less accomplished, and less original than men. He tries to explain these deficits and disqualifiers in ways that do not presuppose women’s natural inferiority. Mill’s primary response to the apologists is to claim that even if the trait is unevenly distributed and functions as a deficit or disqualifier there is nonetheless no evidence of natural inferiority. There is no evidence of natural inferiority, because we cannot be sure that the incapacity is the product of nature, rather than nurture. In particular, because the history of sexual relations has been discriminatory, we cannot rule out the possibility that female incapacity is the product of past discriminatory treatment (Brown, D.G., 1972).
You mean morally good principle, or sole intrinsic good. This makes it almost completely opposite to the Kantian view of Ethics, where moral obligations should be completed because of their moral worth rather than the pleasure you receive out of this.
Brown, D.G., 1972, “Mill on Liberty and Morality,” Philosophical Review, 81: 133–58.
Collini, S., 1979, Liberalism and Sociology: L.T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880–1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, D. (ed.), 1979, New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. V.