Does It Matter If IR Is Eurocentric?
Also for the sake of concision, when talking about the world minus the West, we will use the term non-West or non-Western realities.
Stated differently, anti-Eurocentrics do not differentiate in general between Eurocentrism as an ideology (one that sees Europe, or a more global West as the only active subject of world politics) and Eurocentrism as a picture of the world that derives from the significance of European powers at a certain point in time, basically from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. This perception leads the critics to exaggerate the extent of Eurocentrism in IR. Virtually all forms of analysis that give a prominent role to the European (and Western) actors in the global political order come to be seen as Eurocentric. Whenever a scholar chooses to focus on the significance of the European powers (or the impact of the West), he/she is targeted as Eurocentric. The extent of this problem becomes more visible when considering the work of anti-Eurocentric scholarship, which demonstrates an unending circle of intra-IR disciplinary blaming and bashing.
It has argued that the analysis of Eurocentrism and the way it forms an integral part of the production of knowledge thus needs to take into account the way in which it is re-enacted in the present and not solely at the ‘centre’, but also in other different geopolitical contexts. Eurocentric enactments of the international have been discussed through the spatial and temporal designations through which ‘Gezi’ and ‘Turkey’ were scripted into the international.
Matin, Kamran, ‘Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism’, European Journal of International Relations, 19:2 (2013), p. 354
T. R., William Fox and Annette Baker Fox, ‘The teaching of International Relations in the United States’, World Politics, 13:3 (1961), p. 358