Specify the Two Elements of the Defense of Entrapment
In the supplier cases, the agent's purpose is properly to endeavor to probe to the source of supply, and not merely to arrest the one making the delivery.
The underlying difference between Ashworth’s approach and ours is this (Mike Redmayne, 2012). His attempt to build a working definition is based on how entrapment is defined legally in jurisdictions that have an entrapment defence or in which entrapment can be grounds for stay of legal proceedings against the accused, or for the exclusion of certain evidence. We base our approach on two existing definitions from legal philosophy that have what we take to be the advantage of providing for acts to count as acts of entrapment even when those acts are not committed in jurisdictions in which the concept of entrapment is in legal currency. Their greater generality in this respect, we think, means that they have greater analytical power: that is, they will enable us to understand more than do definitions that adopt the rival, normatively thick, approach to defining entrapment. For example, if an agent merely wants to make the target feel guilty, or to put the target in a position in which the agent has some power over the target other than the power to prosecute, expose, or to threaten to do so, then the act is one of mere beguilement rather than one of the kind of entrapment that mainly interests us. We take it that cases of mere beguilement are philosophically interesting and that they raise similar issues, concerning, for example, the ethics of subjecting others to temptation, as do the cases of entrapment that mainly interest us. The definitions discussed so far attempt to define only legal entrapment to commit a crime. Entrapment may be defined more generally, to encompass all four types identified by dropping the reference to law-enforcement agents and widening the class of induced acts (Fiona Leverick, 2010).
Additionally, since it is an affirmative defense, the criminal defendant has the burden of establishing that entrapment occurred.
United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986)
Fiona Leverick and Findlay Stark, “How do You Solve a Problem Like Entrapment? Jones and Doyle v HM Advocate”, Edinburgh Law Review 14 (3) (2010): pp. 467–472, note (p. 467)
Mike Redmayne, “Exploring Entrapment” in Lucia Zedner and Julian V. Roberts (eds.), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 157–170, pp. 158–159